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Inequities in the distribution of police human 
resources were highlighted1 by the Khayelitsha 
Commission of Inquiry,2 which called for an 
immediate ‘review of the South African Police 
Service [SAPS] mechanism for determining human 
resource allocation’.3 Appointed in August 2012, the 
commission arose from complaints by a group of 
non-governmental organisations operating or based 
in Khayelitsha.4  
Prior to the commission, many assumed that the 
SAPS allocated its available policing resources in 
a rational fashion, based on the relative burden of 
policing faced by different areas. This assumption 
came under question at the commission, when it 
emerged that on a per capita basis, areas such as 
The Khayelitsha Commission revealed that areas that are predominantly populated by people who are poor 
and black are systematically allocated only a small fraction of the average per capita allocation of police 
personnel in the Western Cape. These areas also suffer among the highest rates of murder and serious violent 
crime in the province. The allocation of human resources to policing impinges on various constitutional rights. 
Given the inequity and irrationality apparent in the allocation of police personnel, the Khayelitsha Commission 
recommended that this method be urgently revised. This article reviews the evidence heard on the allocations 
and the method currently used to allocate police personnel, suggests an alternative method, and calls on the 
government to heed the recommendation of the Khayelitsha Commission that the state urgently revise its 
method of allocation of policing resources.
Khayelitsha receive approximately one-third of the 
average per capita allocation. The issue of allocation 
by the state of human resources to policing is one 
that impinges on various constitutional rights, such as 
the right to safety and security of the person, dignity, 
life, and equality before the law, together with the 
right not to be unfairly discriminated against. Where 
the distribution of human resources in policing per 
capita is not only unequal from area to area, but areas 
comprising predominantly poor and black people are 
particularly under-resourced, indirect discrimination 
on protected constitutional grounds exists. Such 
unequal resourcing is automatically unfair unless the 
state can show that the allocations are fair. 
At the commission, one of the authors gave evidence 
that reviewed the relative resourcing of police stations 
in the Western Cape as well as the method employed 
by the SAPS to determine relative resourcing. A 
rational method for determining relative resourcing 
was also proposed. This article recalls the evidence 
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presented, with an adjusted proposed formula, and 
also analyses the evidence provided by various SAPS 
members pertinent to the allocation of resources. 
We conclude that an urgent review of the allocations 
is required. 
How unequal allocations affect 
poor black areas 
Khayelitsha, a Cape Flats township, is located 
approximately 30 km outside of Cape Town, covering 
three SAPS police stations: Khayelitsha (known as 
Site B), Lingelethu-West, and Harare. Khayelitsha the 
township was established in 1983 when certain black 
residents of KTC, Crossroads, Nyanga and Guguletu 
were forcibly relocated under apartheid legislation.5 
Designed to accommodate 30 000 people,6 
Khayelitsha has grown into a set of neighbourhoods 
with a population of about 400 000 people, 
approximately one-half of whom live in formal houses 
and one-half in shacks, mostly in informal settlements 
rather than backyards.7 The average yearly income of 
households in Khayelitsha is estimated at R20 000, 
compared to the Cape Town average of R40 000, 
with expert evidence suggesting that between 32% 
and 46% of all households in Khayelitsha are living in 
‘severe poverty’.8 Crime and violence is endemic to 
the area; murder and contact crime such as assault, 
aggravated robbery and rape are rife.9  
The commission heard a range of evidence on the 
breakdown in relationships, and found that members 
of the community have indeed lost faith in the police’s 
ability to protect them.10 Figure 1 compares residents’ 
rating of the difficulty accessing police in various 
areas, with Khayelitsha and Harare scoring the 
worst of the areas surveyed. The commission heard 
evidence that a lack of human resources was at least 
partly to blame for inadequate service delivery by the 
police. Indeed, senior SAPS members testified before 
the commission that there are not enough operational 
police persons to provide an efficient and effective 
service in Khayelitsha.11 
The commission wished to understand the extent 
to which this insufficiency occurred throughout the 
SAPS, or whether it was specific to the Khayelitsha 
areas. The actual allocation of operational human 
resources to the three Khayelitsha stations as 
well as all the other police stations in the Western 
Cape was therefore obtained from the SAPS by 
the commission.12 The commission requested one 
of the authors to analyse the figures. The numbers 
were simply compared to the respective populations 
of these policing areas to determine differences in 
allocation per capita (per 100 000 people), using 
population data from Census 2011 (see Table 1). 
The calculations showed that Harare, which is among 
the poorest areas of the Western Cape and whose 
population is overwhelmingly black, had the lowest 
number of police personnel per 100 000 people 
of all police stations in the Western Cape (111 per 
100 000 or 901 people for every police person). 
Indeed, Harare had almost 10 times fewer police per 
100 000 than Camps Bay (959 per 100 000 or 104 
persons for every police person). Besides Harare, 
similar areas such as Nyanga and Lwandle also had 
among the lowest per capita allocations of policing 
human resources in the Western Cape. Clearly, 
the evidence suggests that a lack of resources is 
particularly pronounced in these areas. How does 
such a situation come about? 
Figure 1:  Western Cape Department of 
Community Police Satisfaction Safety 
Surveys, 2011, percentage indicating it 
was difficult or very difficult to access 
the police 
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Source: Western Cape Department of Community Safety, 
Community Safety Barometer Reports, April 2011, Bundle 2, File 3, 
Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry. 
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Table 1: Number of police personnel per 100 000 people in the Western Cape ranked from least   
 resourced (green) to most resourced (grey) 
Place
Police 
person-
nel per 
100 000
Actual 
number 
of per-
sonnel 
149 Harare 111.32 192
148 Lwandle 128.94 84
147 Belhar 131.96 75
146 Nyanga 143.82 291
145 Ocean View 146.07 59
144 Delft 149.58 230
143 Cloetesville 152.37 78
142 Kraaifontein 160.05 265
141 Mfuleni 160.63 186
140 Strandfontein 162.79 46
139 Kleinvlei 171.86 166
138 Gugulethu 172.55 214
137 De Doorns 173.78 61
136 Grassy Park 178.27 158
135 Table View 190.21 140
134 Khayelitsha 190.46 294
133 Muizenberg 193.25 114
132 Paarl East 194.77 163
131 Macassar 196.97 69
130
Prince Alfred 
Hamlet
197.43 75
129 Durbanville 201.8 146
128 Franschhoek 204.13 46
127 Hout Bay 204.29 68
126 Malmesbury 205.56 123
125 Saldanha 210.58 61
124 Groot Brakrivier 211 45
123 Darling 214.13 33
122 Dieprivier 214.47 83
121 Steenberg 215.47 133
120 Manenberg 228.65 195
119 Kensington 234.31 60
118 Grabouw 237.11 100
117
Groot-
Drakenstein
238.12 41
116 Brackenfell 240.83 122
115 Bishop Lavis 241.39 256
114 Kwanonqaba 242.1 83
113 Milnerton 242.77 209
112 Lansdowne 245.43 119
111 Philippi East 246.02 138
110 Piketberg 248.58 59
109 VillIersdorp 250.92 58
108 Thembalethu 252.89 111
107 Ravensmead 254 156
106 Kuilsrivier 254.33 183
105 Bothasig 254.86 68
104 Wellington 257.39 138
103 Kirstenhof 257.7 78
102 Gordons Bay 259.48 43
101 Atlantis 259.95 207
100 Knysna 261.26 179
99 Laaiplek 261.53 36
98 Kwanokuthula 262.65 55
Place
Police 
person-
nel per 
100 000
Actual 
number 
of per-
sonnel 
45 Genadendal 421.73 45
44 Vredendal 427.35 110
43 Langebaan 427.72 35
42 Kleinmond 428.08 39
41 Riviersonderend 432.61 34
40 Plettenberg Bay 438.26 118
39 Bellville 450.07 297
38 George 456.94 282
37 Uniondale 466.28 65
36 Da Gamaskop 466.64 121
35 Caledon 467.99 128
34 Vanrhynsdorp 469.58 36
33 Rawsonville 474.29 62
32 Lambertsbaai 480.36 34
31 Murraysburg 484.69 36
30 Barrydale 496.45 37
29 Napier 501.58 34
28 Philadelphia 506.09 37
27 Ladismith 517.43 90
26 Rondebosch 521.71 77
25 Stanford 525.93 32
24 Paarl 526.71 271
23 Prince Albert 528.94 53
22 Calitzdorp 564.02 43
21 Woodstock 569.85 157
20 Claremont 592.22 183
19 Sea Point 592.56 147
18 Mcgregor 604.96 35
17 Eendekuil 617.32 35
16 De Rust 625.98 37
15 Nuwerus 650.88 33
14 Laingsburg 655.17 53
13 Graafwater 688.2 34
12 Mowbray 693.92 69
11 Struisbaai 731.35 33
10 Leeu Gamka 797.83 43
9 Mossel Bay 836.85 88
8 Doring Bay 847.11 28
7 Wynberg 852.57 215
6 Camps Bay 959.51 53
5 Elands Bay 1011.35 26
4 Suurbraak 1086.63 32
3 Redelinghuys 1156.31 28
2
Cape Town 
Central
1544.88 541
1
Table Bay 
Harbour
2636.38 63
Source: Author’s own calculations 
based on figures in letter from 
Provincial Commissioner Lamoer to 
the Khayelitsha Commission dated 
22 October 2013, combined with 
Census 2011 figures (average = 
283 police per 100 000). 
Place
Police 
person-
nel per 
100 000
Actual 
number 
of per-
sonnel 
97 Wolseley 264.12 44
96 Montagu 269.14 63
95 Lutzville 269.42 39
94 Moorreesburg 270.1 63
93 Athlone 270.11 171
92 Pacaltsdorp 270.35 69
91 Lingelethu-West 274.97 177
90 Klapmuts 278.01 38
89 Citrusdal 279.01 54
88 Conville 285.99 135
87 Mbekweni 286.05 115
86 Philippi 287.56 155
85 Somerset West 288.98 165
84 Parow 290.03 175
83 Langa 290.64 138
82 Riebeek West 291.45 47
81 Elsies River 292.72 204
80 Dysselsdorp 294.34 44
79 Fish Hoek 295.75 60
78 Strand 300.39 155
77 Riversdale 311.22 63
76 Hermanus 311.42 149
75 Klawer 317.16 35
74 Worcester 319.61 365
73 Ashton 326.99 61
72 Melkbosstrand 331.08 41
71 Goodwood 332.41 146
70 Simon’s Town 337.35 44
69 Bellville South 337.94 99
68 Pinelands 338.77 70
67 Vredenburg 339.8 140
66 Mitchells Plain 344.97 674
65 Clanwilliam 346.5 55
64 Bonnievale 351.01 49
63 St Helena Bay 362.23 41
62 Ceres 363.34 153
61 Saron 368.81 37
60 Robertson 372.41 133
59 Swellendam 372.53 90
58 Bredasdorp 380.17 86
57 Heidelberg(C) 385.13 60
56 Gans Bay 387.95 59
55 Porterville 388.21 61
54 Oudtshoorn 392.59 293
53 Albertinia 396.27 33
52 Touws River 399.43 35
51 Still Bay 402.98 33
50 Stellenbosch 408.65 218
49 Tulbagh 410.48 77
48 Maitland 414.76 81
47 Hopefield 416.02 37
46 Beaufort West 416.7 167
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How the SAPS determines 
the allocation of resources 
The detail of the SAPS resource allocation process 
was described in evidence at the commission 
by Brigadier Leon Rabie, section head in the 
Performance Management Section of the SAPS 
Organisational Development division located 
in Pretoria. The SAPS allocation is based on a 
‘theoretical’ requirement, calculated on the total time 
taken for all tasks done at a particular police station, 
as affected by a myriad factors. These factors, 
such as the presence of gangs or daily influx of 
commuters, are recorded on an ‘Input Management 
Sheet’.13 The total time is converted into numbers 
of people and this number is called the Theoretical 
Human Resource Requirement (THRR). Summing 
the THRR for every police station gives the national 
requirement for police stations in terms of numbers 
and rank levels. This is the SAPS estimate of the ideal 
number of personnel required for the whole of South 
Africa. Unfortunately the THRR number is larger than 
the budget permits. The total fixed establishment that 
the SAPS budget is able to afford amounts to around 
200 000 personnel for the SAPS in 2013/2014,14 
which implies, Rabie testified, that on average only 
68% of the calculated THRR is available for each 
police station.15
The SAPS’s head office divisions (both national and 
provincial) receive a significant proportion (41%) of the 
total fixed establishment. The remaining 59%, which 
is the actual allocation available to be distributed 
among police stations, amounted to only 117 524 
posts at the time of the commission.16 Thus, once the 
total budgeted numbers are approved, a distribution 
per police station is issued, containing the number of 
posts and the rank of those posts per police station, 
which, as indicated above, typically allocates around 
68% of the calculated THRR to each police station. 
(This budgeted allocation was previously referred to 
as the Resource Allocation Guide [RAG].) Thus the 
‘fixed establishment’ or RAG eventually arrived at 
is not the same as the THRR, as it only reflects the 
number of posts that could be established in terms 
of the SAPS budget and medium-term expenditure 
framework. The legislation does permit  SAPS 
provincial commissioners to make adjustments within 
the provincial allocation, but it appears this is 
seldom done.
By only bringing budget constraints into consideration 
after determining the services to be offered by each 
police station and the ideal numbers of personnel 
needed for those services, the SAPS condemns 
the various services offered at police stations to 
be perennially understaffed in terms of its own 
theoretical calculations. The logic is something akin 
to planning to build many houses with many rooms 
and calculating the number of bricks needed, then, 
as a result of budget constraints, proceeding to build 
all the rooms in the houses with only three out of four 
walls due to the number of bricks available.  
Flaws in the SAPS method 
Apart from the problem of budget constraints 
resulting in the THRR’s being unachievable, the SAPS 
THRR itself has a number of flaws. Some of these 
will be considered here, to demonstrate how an 
apparently rigorous method can result in absurdity. 
The factors in the Input Management Sheet used to 
inform the THRR purport to relate to the burden of 
policing in one of the following ways: 
•	 They	affect	the	burden	in	terms	of	difficulty	
and extent of policing (e.g. number of square 
kilometres, presence of schools, daily influx of 
commuters, number of gangs), including the actual 
incidence of crime
•	 They	affect	the	burden	of	police	interaction	with	the	
courts and with prisons (e.g. proximity of courts 
and prisons) 
•	 They	affect	the	burden	of	internal	police	
bureaucracy (e.g. accounting stations, services 
offered, etc.) 
The first problem is that it is impossible to take 
note of all relevant factors impinging on the burden 
of policing. Furthermore, different factors may be 
counted twice, resulting in double-counting. For 
example, the presence of schools and influx of 
commuters are to some extent reflected in each 
other; taking account of both may lead to double-
counting. Even assuming one could take account 
of all relevant factors without double-counting, 
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the approach is highly dependent on accurate 
information being supplied. Incorrect estimates can 
result in large distortions. Indeed, the SAPS itself 
alluded to misrepresentations apparently designed to 
influence resource allocation in submitted evidence. 
Finally, even assuming one could take into account 
all relevant factors without double-counting, the issue 
of the weight that should be ascribed to each factor 
comes into play. While the total formula was not 
provided in the evidence, some of the factors and 
their weightings  were described. The hundreds of 
factors taken into account are combined together in 
a formula composed of these factors, with particular 
weights ascribed to them. These weights seem to 
have been arrived at in an arbitrary manner and 
without basis in any evidence. 
For example, in relation to the factor of ‘informal 
housing percentage’, Rabie testified that if between 
1% and 2.5% of the population lives in informal 
dwellings, the police station establishment is 
increased by 1%.17 If 10% or more of the population 
live in informal dwellings, the supplement is increased 
by 5%.18 This 5% is the maximum weighting, even 
if – as in the case of Khayelitsha – the THRR input 
sheet indicates 75% of the population living in 
informal dwellings.19  
The weighting of 5% does not seem to be based on 
any empirical evidence. Colonel Nel (former station 
commander Harare) and Colonel Ralibola (station 
commander of Harare at the time) testified that 
vehicles cannot police informal areas, and foot patrols 
require between six and 10 members.20 This would 
suggest that the visible policing allocation for sector 
patrols would have to be inflated between three and 
five times (as normally two people would patrol in one 
vehicle) for the proportion of the population in informal 
areas – in other words, a 300% to  500% supplement 
to the visible policing component. Applied to the 
minimum of 17 police officials per sector, this would 
imply between 51 and 85 additional members 
necessary for patrolling, per sector. 
Figure 2 shows Harare and Khayelitsha residents’ 
dissatisfaction with various kinds of policing, with 
foot patrols unsurprisingly scoring very high levels of 
dissatisfaction. 
Detective services also face challenges in informal 
settlements. Whereas a thorough investigation of a 
murder scene requires at least three hours, murders 
that have been committed (a) within a concentrated 
area of informal houses, and (b) without direct road 
access to the on-site investigation, pose unique 
and difficult challenges. The environment directly 
impacts on the investigation time, with the situation 
being worse at night, due to inadequate lighting. 
Management of the crime scene, in relation to basic 
tasks such as evacuating people from their shacks, 
Police officers on foot patrols
Police response to distress call
Service at the police station
Service to victims and survivors of crime
Police liaison/relationship with community
Police special operations (crime sweeps)
Police special operations (roadblocks)
Police officers on vehicle patrols
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
68.4
53.2
55.6
42.8
44.4
42.8
42.4
35.6
68.7
62.5
48.0
49.8
46.4
46.0
41.0
27.1
Source: Collated from Western Cape Department of Community Safety, Community Safety Barometer Reports for Harare and for Khayelitsha, 
April 2011, Bundle 2, File 3, Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry.
Percentage responding ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ police service
Harare Khayelitsha
Figure 2: Western Cape Department of Community Safety, Police Satisfaction Safety Surveys, 2011, 
percentage of respondents rating selected SAPS services as ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’
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cordoning off the area and locating forensic evidence 
such as bullets or spent cartridges is arduous or even 
impossible without additional personnel.21 
Indeed, the expectation among SAPS commanders 
was that the factor ‘informal housing percentage’ 
would have more of an impact on human resource 
allocation: former Harare station commander Colonel 
Nel testified that he was so concerned about the 
shortage of personnel allocated to him in terms of the 
then RAG that he had ‘spent many evenings poring 
over satellite maps of Harare, counting informal 
dwellings to try to increase the number of members 
Harare would be allocated’.22 Nel appears not to have 
been aware that however hard he tried, no more than 
a 5% weighting would apply.  
The above briefly alludes to a few of the ways in 
which the THRR goes astray. Ultimately, however, the 
best test of the SAPS’s method is common sense. 
Does the method accurately and fairly distribute 
resources on the basis of burden of policing?  
The reality is that the allocations results in township 
areas, known for their difficulty of policing, almost 
all demonstrate massive downward adjustment 
from what would be suggested by the size of the 
population only. Indeed, not only is it the case that the 
adjustment is downward, but it is such that township 
areas are among the least resourced per capita, 
despite being among the most difficult to police. 
Unless the SAPS wishes to argue that the burden of 
policing is indeed lowest in Harare, Lwandle, Belhar 
and Nyanga, and that the lowest resourcing per 
capita in these areas is therefore fair, these results 
alone demonstrate the flaw in the SAPS approach 
and suggest flaws in either one or all the factors 
considered, their weighting, or the input data. 
Proposed method of 
allocating resources 
The question then arises as to what would be a 
fair method of adjusting per capita figures to take 
into account the burden of policing. The first key 
change required with any method of determining 
a fair method of allocation of resources is to begin 
with the number of available human resources (in 
contrast to what is done at present) – in other words, 
the 117 524 posts available for allocation to police 
stations (leaving aside the issue of whether 41% of the 
close to 200 000 available posts should be allocated to 
divisions and provincial offices).
The starting point is the size of the population – areas 
with larger populations should have proportionally more 
resources. However, we know that policing burden is 
not determined only by population size. The question 
then arises as to what a fair method of adjusting per 
capita figures would be, taking into account differing 
burdens of policing for different components of policing. 
The annual report of the SAPS typically distinguishes 
between the number of human resources allocated 
to Administration, Visible Policing, Detective Services, 
Crime Intelligence, Protection and Security.23 The 
Protection and Security Services component of policing 
appears not to be relevant to policing at station level, as 
it apparently serves only dignitaries. For the purposes 
of national figures and formula calculations, these are 
presumably then not included in the 117 524 available 
posts. (A separate issue for consideration is whether 
the amount spent on this component, and thus on 
dignitaries, is justified.)  
Determining the burden of policing on detective 
services is relatively straightforward. This can be 
directly measured by the incidence of crime reported 
at the police station, as a detective’s burden is directly 
determined by the amount of crime reported. Assuming 
that the detective services conduct only reactive 
investigations (and that crime intelligence is thus 
responsible for pro-active investigations), the incidence 
of reported crime, in particular serious reported crime, 
should be the primary determinant of relative resourcing 
in relation to detective services.  
By contrast, the work of crime intelligence should be 
directly related to the number of crimes, particularly 
serious violent crime, actually occurring in the area 
(actual incidence of crime), rather than reported crime. 
Crime intelligence contributes to the neutralisation of 
crime by gathering, collating and analysing intelligence 
information that leads to actionable policing activity. 
But how do we know what the incidence of serious 
violent crime is, given that there is a high degree of 
under-reporting, particularly in places like Khayelitsha? 
Figure 3 shows the extent of under-reporting believed 
to occur by respondents in Western Cape Department 
of Community Safety surveys in selected policing areas. 
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One reported crime indicator that is not susceptible to 
reporting trends is murder. This is particularly robust; 
checked against morgue data it does not appear 
to be suffering significant under-reporting: over five 
years the total variance is 1.7% for the Khayelitsha 
‘drainage area’ (comprising all three policing areas). 
In areas where there are high reporting rates, 
murder tends to track serious violent crimes such as 
aggravated robbery, and can be considered to be a 
proxy for such crimes.24
In the absence of any other indicator, the incidence of 
serious violent crime, as indicated by proxy through 
the number of murders, should be the primary 
determinant of the relative resourcing of the crime 
intelligence component. Some areas, however, record 
no murders at all. In these areas, posts allocated to 
administration or management may need to take over 
this function. 
Visible policing, however, should not only be about 
responding to crime, but about carrying out policing 
in a manner that prevents crime.  Consequently it may 
be that visible policing functions carried out in current 
relatively crime-free areas will cease to be crime-
free areas if such resourcing is removed. In other 
words, ‘the incidence of crime’ should not replace 
‘total population’ as the determinant of allocation for 
visible policing, not least also because varying rates 
of reporting mean the actual incidence of crime is 
difficult to determine from area to area. For the same 
reason ‘reported crime’ should not determine visible 
policing allocations.
This is even more so because ‘visible policing’, in 
terms of SAPS functions, does not predominantly 
involve ‘visible policing’ as per a layperson’s 
understanding. The organisational structure of visible 
policing at a category C1 or C2 police station is 
illustrated below (see Annexure A), showing a range 
of functions, many of which are to some degree 
office-based.  Since demand for these additional 
functions is likely to be determined by population 
size, this further supports the argument that the 
population size of the policing area should be 
the main determinant of the number of personnel 
allocated. Within the number allocated to visible 
policing, however, there should be room for individual 
police stations to tailor the command structure to 
meet unique needs. This could mean, for example, 
Figure 3:  Western Cape Department of 
Community Safety, Police Satisfaction 
Safety Survey 2011, percentage 
agreeing that ‘victims report crime all or 
most of the time’ 
Table 2:  Pathology homicide and SAPS murder 
reports compared, Khayelitsha area 
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‘Victims report crime most or all of the time’ %
Source 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Forensic 
pathology 
homicides 
(January to 
December) 
308 312 294 356 361 1 631
 
2008 
/9
2009 
/10
2010 
/11
2011 
/12
2012 
/13
Total 
SAPS 
murders 
(March to 
February) 
283 290 310 360 354 1 597
Forensic 
pathology 
homicides 
(March to 
February)  
306 301 312 350 355 1 624
Not 
recorded 
by SAPS as 
murder
23 11 2 -9 1 27
% not 
recorded 
by SAPS  
as murder
7.5% 3.7% 0.6% -2.6% 0.3% 1.7%
Source: Author’s own calculations using information provided 
by Forensic Pathology Services, Head Office, Western Cape 
Government, 6 November 2012, to the Khayelitsha Commission, 
and SAPS crime data, www.saps.gov.za.
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more people allocated to sector teams in  
Khayelitsha at the expense perhaps of fewer   
people for ‘general enquires’.  
Consequently, in relation to visible policing, it is 
recommended that the total population (the per 
capita measure) should remain the primary indicator 
of relative resourcing. This is particularly important as 
visible policing is the largest component of the SAPS. 
There is an argument that this is too conservative 
and that in fact the incidence of violent crime should 
be the primary determinant of visible policing. The 
counter-argument is that much violent crime, in 
contrast with property crime, takes place in private 
spaces, which are not affected by visible policing. 
The primary indicator of the administrative burden 
should thus be the population of the area served; 
alternatively, the total size of the policing allocation 
already made. 
Proposed method for national figures 
What does this method imply in practice regarding 
current figures? According to the SAPS Annual 
Report of 2013, the personnel available to the SAPS 
is as follows (noting that 21% of these personnel are 
Public Service Act employees as opposed to SAPS 
Act employees). The distribution of the 177 524 
operational personnel is calculated using the ratios 
obtained from the annual reports. 
As described above, the primary determinant of 
visible policing and administrative function resources 
should be population size. Thus, the available 
administrative and visible policing personnel must be 
divided equally among the population. To do this the 
total number of relevant personnel in South Africa is 
divided by the total population of South Africa, 
and multiplied by 100 000, to arrive at the number 
per 100 000. 
On current personnel and population figures as 
indicated in Table 3, this implies that there should 
be 43 administrative personnel for every 100 000 
population and 123 visible police personnel per 
100 000 people. To calculate the number of 
visible policing personnel in a particular area, the 
population of that area must be divided by 100 000 
and multiplied by 123, while for the number of 
administrative staff the population is divided by 
100 000 and multiplied by 43. 
The resourcing of the detective service component 
is by contrast primarily indicated by the number 
of crimes reported to the SAPS. The available 
detective resources must be divided equally among 
all reported serious crimes. The total number of 
detective personnel in South Africa is divided by total 
serious crimes in South Africa. To account for yearly 
anomalies, the average of the last four years’ crime 
figures should be used. On current national personnel 
and crime figures this amounts to 2 101 417 crimes. 
This works out to 0.0115 detectives for every crime 
recorded, i.e. 115 detectives for every 10 000 crimes 
(or just over one detective for every 100 crimes). 
The primary indicator of the relative resourcing of the 
crime intelligence component, as discussed above, 
is the average number of murders over the last four 
years, which amounts to 16 141. The available crime 
intelligence resources must be divided equally among 
all murders recorded. On current figures this would 
imply on average 0.339 crime intelligence personnel 
for every murder recorded in an area over the last 
four years. 
Thus, a proposed ‘national primary distribution 
formula’, based on current available personnel, 
would look like this: (population * 43 / 100 000) + 
(population * 123 / 100 000) + (total serious crimes 
* 115/10 000) + (murders * 0.339).
Table 3:  SAPS national personnel by function 
 and rate per 100 000 population   
SAPS 
function 
Number 
of 
personnel
(total 
national) 
Personnel 
per 
100 000 
people 
(using 
52 982 000 
population)
Ratio 
(%)
Number of 
operational 
personnel 
available 
for 
police 
stations 
Administration 36 703 69.27 19.16 22 517
Visible 
policing 
106 527 201.06 55.60 65 343
Detective 
services 
39 425 74.41 20.58 24 186
Crime 
intelligence 
8 928 16.85 4.66 5 476
Subtotal 191 583 361.60 – 117 522
Protection 
and security 
6 363 12.01 – –
Total 197 946 373.61 – 117 524
Source: Author’s own calculations using SAPS Annual Report 2013 
and Census 2011.
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Unlike the actual resource per capita figures, 
allocation on this basis does not result in township 
areas occupying the bottom of the resource list on 
a per capita basis. Instead, township areas occupy 
the middle band of resourcing. The reason townships 
do not occupy the ‘most resourced’ slot at the top 
of the list is because of the relatively low rate of 
reported crime (compared to actual crime). Most 
over-resourced are those areas with high daytime 
populations, such as Cape Town and Wynberg. 
High daytime populations drive up the reporting of 
crime, and reported crime is a significant factor in this 
formula. Nevertheless, their allocation would still need 
to reduce significantly in order to meet the proposed 
number, while Nyanga, for instance, would need an 
additional 237 people. (See Table 4 overleaf.)
Adjustments to the primary 
distribution allocations 
Rational adjustments to the primary distribution 
formula might include those brought about when the 
formula results in a number of personnel too small to 
warrant a viable police station. This can be overcome 
by allocating to each station the minimum number of 
personnel necessary for a police station of that type 
(for example, a satellite station with limited opening 
hours requires at least four personnel).
Wherever the minimum number for the station type 
concerned is higher than the number suggested by 
the primary distribution formula as initially applied, the 
minimum number becomes the number allocated to 
that area. Whenever that substitution occurs, each 
such difference between the allocated number and 
the minimum number must be subtracted from the 
total number to be used in an amended formula. The 
primary distribution formula is then applied to the 
stations that have not had the minimum allocated, 
using the reduced totals. 
For example, for the purposes of illustration assume 
that 12 is the minimum number of personnel for all 
police stations of all types. All police stations with 
primary distribution formula allocations below 12, of 
which there are say five, are allocated 12 personnel. 
From the total available personnel, 60 are removed 
from the total. For the formula calculations, the 
respective populations, crime numbers and murder 
numbers emanating from the already allocated areas 
must  be subtracted from those totals in order to 
calculate the factors that must be applied to the 
remaining 144 stations.  
Conclusion 
In our view the pattern of unequal allocation of police 
resources between wealthy and poor suburbs in the 
Western Cape has not been adequately justified for 
rationality and fairness by the SAPS, and thus violates 
the equality clause (section 9) of the Constitution.25 
In addition, whatever method used to allocate 
human resources must be open and transparent, 
and subject to public comment and scrutiny.26 Any 
anomalous per capita allocations must be rationally 
explainable. The findings and recommendations 
of the commission highlight the pressing need to 
review the resource allocation process. Indeed, data 
obtained by the Natal Witness showed that the same 
patterns of inequity apply in KwaZulu-Natal.
Special emphasis should be placed on the equitable 
distribution of experienced personnel with specialist 
skills in the investigation of serious contact crimes. 
Subsequent to the commission, a cohort of new, 
inexperienced recruits was allocated to Khayelitsha.27 
This does little to rectify the situation, as new recruits 
require careful mentoring – thus placing an additional 
burden on experienced personnel. Furthermore, it 
does not address the overall situation of inequity – 
areas such as Nyanga, for example, are also very 
under-resourced. New recruits should be deployed 
to stations where experienced officers have the ability 
to provide mentorship, and parliament must exercise 
its oversight effectively in ensuring that the SAPS 
addresses the inequities affecting the most under-
resourced stations in each province.  
August 2015 marks the one-year anniversary 
of the submission of the commission’s report to 
the premier. To date, no firm commitment has 
been made by the national offices of the SAPS to 
ensure that the service deficiencies revealed by 
the commission will be addressed. Ndifuna Ukwazi  
and its partners were instrumental in campaigning 
for the commission. These organisations are now 
striving to ensure that there is momentum behind 
the call for the implementation of the commission’s 
recommendations. The commission has already 
resulted in the largest release of police data to the 
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Source: Own calculations using Census 2011. 
Place
Table Bay 
Harbour
22 917 -41
Cape Town 
Central
273 779 -268
Sea Point 96 389 -51
Woodstock 107 387 -50
Claremont 116 375 -67
Wynberg 93 370 -122
Stellenbosch 193 361 -25
Mitchells Plain 682 349 8
Bellville 229 347 -68
Mossel Bay 36 347 -52
Kleinmond 32 346 -7
Camps Bay 19 342 -34
Mowbray 34 339 -35
Philippi 177 328 22
Rondebosch 48 324 -29
Parow 192 318 17
Athlone 200 316 29
Kirstenhof 95 314 17
Maitland 61 314 -20
Strand 160 310 5
Elsies River 214 307 10
Beaufort West 121 302 -46
Paarl 156 302 -115
Gordons Bay 50 302 7
Manenberg 257 302 62
George 186 301 -96
Milnerton 259 301 50
Plettenberg Bay 80 299 -38
Goodwood 131 299 -15
Pinelands 61 295 -9
Hout Bay 97 291 29
Swellendam 70 290 -20
Dieprivier 112 290 29
Worcester 330 289 -35
Conville 135 286 0
Somerset West 163 285 -2
Kuilsrivier 205 285 22
Fish Hoek 58 284 -2
Langebaan 23 283 -12
Bishop Lavis 300 283 44
Ravensmead 174 283 18
Albertinia 24 282 -9
Kleinvlei 271 281 105
Da Gamaskop 72 279 -49
Laingsburg 23 279 -30
Knysna 191 279 12
Grassy Park 247 279 89
Gugulethu 344 277 130
Touws River 24 277 -11
Bellville South 81 275 -18
Place
Saldanha 72 247 11
Vredendal 64 247 -46
Lambertsbaai 17 247 -17
Wolseley 41 246 -3
Hermanus 118 246 -31
Strandfontein 70 246 24
Paarl East 206 246 43
Malmesbury 147 245 24
De Rust 14 245 -23
Lutzville 35 245 -4
Barrydale 18 244 -19
St Helena Bay 28 244 -13
Pacaltsdorp 62 244 -7
Prince Albert 24 244 -29
Ashton 45 242 -16
De Doorns 85 241 24
Thembalethu 106 240 -5
Moorreesburg 56 240 -7
Laaiplek 33 239 -3
Mbekweni 95 237 -20
Simon's Town 31 237 -13
Riversdale 48 236 -15
Vanrhynsdorp 18 235 -18
Kwanokuthula 49 235 -6
Napier 16 234 -18
Franschhoek 53 234 7
Heidelberg(C) 36 233 -24
Bonnievale 32 232 -17
Montagu 54 231 -9
Groot-
Drakenstein
40 231 -1
Ocean View 93 231 34
Graafwater 11 230 -23
Murraysburg 17 229 -19
Harare 395 229 203
Darling 35 229 2
Melkbosstrand 28 228 -13
Lwandle 147 226 63
Still Bay 18 226 -15
Piketberg 53 225 -6
Mcgregor 13 225 -22
Prince Alfred 
Hamlet
85 224 10
Cloetesville 113 221 35
Groot Brakrivier 47 218 2
Hopefield 19 216 -18
Dysselsdorp 32 212 -12
Doring Bay 7 205 -21
Eendekuil 11 197 -24
Nuwerus 8 166 -25
Place
Steenberg 169 273 36
Vredenburg 112 272 -28
Rawsonville 35 271 -27
Klapmuts 37 270 -1
Table View 199 270 59
Gans Bay 41 269 -18
Brackenfell 136 269 14
Riviersonderend 21 268 -13
Kwanonqaba 92 268 9
Stanford 16 267 -16
Calitzdorp 20 266 -23
Ceres 112 266 -41
Lansdowne 129 265 10
Elands Bay 7 264 -19
Ladismith 46 263 -44
Muizenberg 155 263 41
Oudtshoorn 196 262 -97
Kensington 67 262 7
Macassar 92 261 23
Riebeek West 42 261 -5
Nyanga 528 261 237
Kraaifontein 432 261 167
Tulbagh 49 261 -28
Uniondale 36 261 -29
Belhar 148 261 73
Mfuleni 301 260 115
Genadendal 28 260 -17
Langa 123 259 -15
Struisbaai 12 259 -21
Lingelethu-West 167 259 -10
Atlantis 206 258 -1
Wellington 138 258 0
Robertson 92 257 -41
Klawer 28 256 -7
Durbanville 185 256 39
Philippi East 144 256 6
Leeu Gamka 14 256 -29
Caledon 70 255 -58
Delft 391 255 161
Citrusdal 49 255 -5
Khayelitsha 390 253 96
Clanwilliam 40 252 -15
Philadelphia 18 251 -19
Grabouw 106 251 6
Bredasdorp 57 250 -29
Villiersdorp 58 249 0
Porterville 39 249 -22
Suurbraak 7 249 -25
Saron 25 249 -12
Redelinghuys 6 248 -22
Bothasig 66 248 -2
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Table 4: Proposed resourcing of police stations in the Western Cape, using proposed primary 
 distribution formula only 
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public in South African history.28 This data allows us to 
understand the systemic problems within the SAPS, 
which continue to hamper its ability to provide efficient 
and effective services to communities. The inequitable 
allocation of police resources, favouring the protection 
of capital and wealth rather than poor and crime-
ridden communities, is a glaring fault. 
But the issue revolves around more than just a 
rectification of a formula for proper resource allocation. 
Communities such as Khayelitsha, which are plagued 
by some of the highest crime rates in South Africa, 
require decision makers within the SAPS, the DoCS 
and the City of Cape Town, inter alia, to muster the 
political will to develop a comprehensive plan to 
ensure that the rights of township inhabitants to safety 
and security are protected.  
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
Notes
1 K O’Regan and V Pikoli, Towards a safer Khayelitsha: the 
report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Allegations of 
Police Inefficiency and a Breakdown in Relations between 
SAPS and the Community in Khayelitsha [KC report], 
Summary, August 2014, xxiv.
2 The Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of 
Police Inefficiency and a Breakdown in Relations between 
SAPS and the Community of Khayelitsha, also referred to as 
the O’Regan-Pikoli Commission.
3 KC report, Summary, xxvi. 
4 The Social Justice Coalition (SJC), the Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC), Equal Education (EE), the Triangle Project 
and Ndifuna Ukwazi (NU) (referred to jointly as the complainant 
organisations).
5 Ndifuna Ukwazi, Our evidence for the commission: a collection 
of community affidavits submitted to the O’Regan-Pikoli 
Commission of Inquiry into policing in Khayelitsha, 2014, 3. 
6 Ibid.
7 J Seekings, Economy, society and municipal services 
in Khayelitsha: report for the Commission of Inquiry into 
Allegations of Police Inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a 
Breakdown in Relations between SAPS and the Community 
of Khayelitsha, Centre for Social Science Research, 
University of Cape Town, December 2013, http://www. 
khayelitshacommission.org.za/images/witnesses/13.%20
Jeremy%20Seekings%20Dec%202013.pdf (accessed  
24 June 2015). 
8 KC report, 40, para. 37.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., Summary, xxv. 
11 Ibid., 391, para. 154. 
12 Letter from Lt. Gen. Arno Lamoer on behalf of the Provincial 
Commissioner, 22 October 2013. It was of some concern 
Place
Saldanha 72 247 11
Vredendal 64 247 -46
Lambertsbaai 17 247 -17
Wolseley 41 246 -3
Hermanus 118 246 -31
Strandfontein 70 246 24
Paarl East 206 246 43
Malmesbury 147 245 24
De Rust 14 245 -23
Lutzville 35 245 -4
Barrydale 18 244 -19
St Helena Bay 28 244 -13
Pacaltsdorp 62 244 -7
Prince Albert 24 244 -29
Ashton 45 242 -16
De Doorns 85 241 24
Thembalethu 106 240 -5
Moorreesburg 56 240 -7
Laaiplek 33 239 -3
Mbekweni 95 237 -20
Simon's Town 31 237 -13
Riversdale 48 236 -15
Vanrhynsdorp 18 235 -18
Kwanokuthula 49 235 -6
Napier 16 234 -18
Franschhoek 53 234 7
Heidelberg(C) 36 233 -24
Bonnievale 32 232 -17
Montagu 54 231 -9
Groot-
Drakenstein
40 231 -1
Ocean View 93 231 34
Graafwater 11 230 -23
Murraysburg 17 229 -19
Harare 395 229 203
Darling 35 229 2
Melkbosstrand 28 228 -13
Lwandle 147 226 63
Still Bay 18 226 -15
Piketberg 53 225 -6
Mcgregor 13 225 -22
Prince Alfred 
Hamlet
85 224 10
Cloetesville 113 221 35
Groot Brakrivier 47 218 2
Hopefield 19 216 -18
Dysselsdorp 32 212 -12
Doring Bay 7 205 -21
Eendekuil 11 197 -24
Nuwerus 8 166 -25
that in the data submitted in this letter, although the column 
submitted by the SAPS was labelled ‘police personnel per 
population’, in fact the column indicated the number of 
people per police person. The incorrect formulation could give 
the impression Harare was well-resourced. Population figures 
were slightly different from those independently calculated, 
but this did not affect the trends observed. 
13 Statement by Leon Rabie to the Khayelitsha Commission of 
Inquiry.
14 Ibid., para. 5.5. 
15 KC report, 245, para. 105. Presidential police stations, such 
as Khayelitsha Site B, may receive close to 100% of their 
allocation, with others receiving less than the 68% average as 
a consequence.
16 Statement by Leon Rabie, para. 5.5.
17 KC report, 245, para. 103.
18 Ibid. This does not match the information provided in his 
affidavit. 
19 Annexure A to Rabie’s affidavit. 
20 KC report, 232, para. 50.
21 Ndifuna Ukwazi, evidence to the Khayelitsha Commission 
 of Inquiry.
22 KC report, 232, para. 51.
23 SAPS, Annual report, 2014 , 250.
24 See, inter alia, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Global study 
on homicide 2011: key findings, https://www.unodc.org/
documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Global_
study_on_homicide_Key_findings.pdf.
25 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
26  KC report, 274, para. 219 
27 Interview with Major General J  Brand, Station Commander, 
Khayelitsha. 
28 See Khayelitsha Commission, Information, http://www.
khayelitshacommission.org.za/2013-11-10-19-36-33.html. 
InstItute for securIty studIes26
Annexure A: The organisational structure of visible policing at a category C1 or C2 police station:  
exhibit 
management
crime 
prevention
sector 
managers
sector teams ‘focus on all 
facets of visible policing 
including crime prevention, 
attending to complaints and 
special operations’ . 
receive 80% of ‘crime 
prevention and sector 
policing’ allocation
only stations with at least 
882 entries into cells 
recorded on SAPS14 per 
year qualify for custody 
management� Minimum of 
16+1 for 24 hour service 
Crime Prevention ‘caters 
or functions related to 
coordinating reservists, 
rural safety co-ordination, 
victim-friendly facilities, 
gender-based projects, 
community policing forums, 
community partnerships 
and community policing’. 
receives 20% of ‘crime 
prevention and sector 
policing’ allocation
satellite 
stations and 
contact points 
operational 
support
Visible 
policing
sector teams 
(four shifts, 
minimum 
16+1 for 
24 hours plus 
two vehicles) 
Firearms, 
liquor, second-
hand goods
General 
inquiries
court 
services
community 
service centre
(four shifts, 
minimum of 
16+1 members 
for 24 hours)
operations 
commander
Custody 
management
other service 
points
shift 
commander 
(four shifts)
only at 
stations with 
full-time courts; 
court orderlies 
and court cell 
management 
Liquor licences 
and policing, 
firearm 
applications, 
second-hand 
dealership 
applications 
Police 
clearance, 
PDP, vehicle 
clearance, 
warrants, 
accident 
reports, etc.
